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RECENT CASES
the husband is powerless to compel her to do so. In view of
the one paragraph opinion in Malcolm, the Supreme Court does
not agree.
It is submitted that the decision rendered in this case may
prove to be unworkable and that it results in an inequity to the
husband in a community property state. Perhaps the Louisiana
Code is the source of inequity with its provision for renunciation
by a wife, but none for a husband (although, as discussed above,
Section 2410 of the Code is open to an interpretation other than
the unjust one applied here).
One wonders whether the Court of Appeals would have been
so willing to allow the taxpayer to escape liability if it had been
the husband who sought to renounce his community interest and
thereby have all the income assessed to his wife. In a time when
the law is ever more watchful of women's rights under the guise
of "women's lib," perhaps it should also consider declaring uncon-
stitutional such archaic laws as Section 2410 of the Louisiana Code,
or courts should at least avoid interpretations of laws which will
afford special privileges to women merely because they are women.
After all, equality is a double-edged sword; we must be careful
that women be equal to men, but also careful that they aren't
made, by decisions such as this, more equal than men.
DWIGHT F. KALASH
SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT-ARMED SERVICES-REOPENING I-S(C)
CLASSIFICATION-While not enrolled at a university, plaintiff was
ordered to report for induction. Prior to the date of his scheduled
induction, he voluntarily enrolled at a university, notified his local
draft board of his new student status, and requested to be reclassi-
fied from I-A to I-S(c). The local board refused to reopen his
classification stating that the facts presented were not sufficient
to qualify him for a I-S (c) deferment since they did not show
that he was satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course of instruction
on the date of receipt of his induction order. Thereafter, plaintiff
sought an injunction from the United States District Court, to enjoin
the local board from inducting him.
In declining jurisdiction and at the same time deciding the
merits of the case the court held that the failure of the local
board to reopen plaintiff's I-A classification when informed of
his new status was not "blatantly lawless"' because the board
1. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 460(b) (3) (1967) states: "No Judicial review shall be made
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is not obligated by the regulations to reopen unless facts are pre-
sented which show that the registrant was pursuing a full-time
course of instruction at the same time that he received his order
to report.2 Peller v. Selective Service Local Board No. 65, 313 F.
Supp. 100 (N.D. Indiana 1970).
The court in the instant case, while rejecting arguments offered
by plaintiff as to the literal meaning of the relevant sections of
the Selective Service Regulations, based the denial of mandatory
reopening on its understanding of the fundamental purpose of the
I-S (c) deferment. The court stated that a contrary finding would
result in an undue administrative burden on the Selective Service
System because it would put a premium on stalling tactics and
increase the chances for fraud on the part of the registrant. 8
More specifically, the court stated that the I-S(c) deferment is
basically a relief measure and the regulation should not be inter-
preted in such a manner as to provide relief where the student
has put himself in the detrimental position he is in.4
The statute and regulations which bear upon the question raised
by the instant case (i.e. Must the local board reopen the classifi-
cation of a student who, after he has received his order to report
for induction, voluntarily enrolls in a full-time course of instruction
at a unversity?) are primarily four in number. They are the Military
Selective Service Act of 19675 and Sections 1622.15 (b), 1625.3 (b),
and 1625.2 of the Selective Service Regulations. Section 1622.15(b)
states:
In Class I-S shall be placed any registrant who while satis-
factorily pursuing a full-time course of instruction at a col-
ege, . . .is ordered to report for induction ....
Section 1625.3 (b) states:
The local board shall reopen . . . the classification of a
registrant to whom it has mailed an Order to Report for
Induction . . . whenever facts are presented to the local
board which establish the registrant's eligibility for classifi-
of the classification or processing of any registrant by local boards, . .." and it would,
on its face, seem to preclude any Judicial review of classification of registrants. How-
ever, the U.S. Supreme Court in Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Board No.
11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968), held that despite the broad language of the statute, preinduction
review is proper in extreme cases where the conduct of the local board is "blatantly law-
less" or constitutes a clear departure from statutory mandate. From this holding it is
clear that the question of the District Court's jurisdiction is decided concurrently with
the merits of the plaintiff's claim of misconduct on the part of the local board.
2. Peller v. Selective Service Local Board No. 65, 313 F. Supp. 100 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
3. Id. at 104.
4. Id.
5. Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 456(t)(2).
6. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.15(b) (1967), hereafter referred to as § 15(b).
7. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.3(b) (1963), hereafter referred to as § 3(b).
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cation into Class I-S because he is satisfactorily pursuing
a full time course of instruction . . . . (emphasis supplied) .7
Section 1625.2 states:
. . . the classification of a registrant shall not be reopened
after the local board has mailed to such registrant an Order
to Report for Induction . . . unless the local board first spe-
cifically finds there has been a change in the registrant's
status resulting from circumstances over which the regis-
trant had no control.8
When interpreting these sections, great weight should be given
to the construction consistently applied to a statue by the Executive
Department with its administrative regulations; such construction
not being overturned unless a different construction is plainly re-
quired.9 Also, the relevant sections of the regulations must be
read as a whole, yet the independent meaning of 'each section
should be maintained 0 and the courts should rarely go behind
the terms of the sections to define the motive for their enactment."
Interpretation of the Regulations by the U. S. District Courts
has led to two contrary results. 1 2 One interpretation has led to
the result reached in the instant case, while the other has led
to a finding that the local board must reopen the classification
of the registrant and thus automatically cancel the outstanding
induction order. In McLain v. Local Board No. 47,13 the U.S. District
Court ruled that a registrant's classification must be reopened when
the local board is informed of the fact that the registrant is enrolled
in school. 14 Thus the court disregarded the fact that the registrant
enrolled after he received his order to report for induction.
In light of these two contrary decisions by the Federal Courts,
it appears that a final resolution of the question will entail a
more thorough analysis of the Regulations and a search for compel-
ling policies which bear upon the question.
A discussion of the literal meaning of the Military Selective
Service Act 456 (i) (2) and its counterpart, section 15(b) of the
Regulations, does not appear to be decisive of the question as
8. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1955), hereafter referred to as § 2.
9. United States v. Jackson, 280 U.S. 183, 193 (1930), citing United States v. Cre-
cedo Hermanos y Compania, 209 U.S. 337 (1908) ; United States v. Johnson, 124 U.S. 236,
353 (1888).
10. NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 54 (1964).
11. United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72, 76 (2d Cir, 1966).
12. Peller v. Selective Service Local Board No. 65, 313 F. SUpp. 100 (N.D. Ind. 1970)
McLain v. Selective Service Local Board No. 47, Cir. No. 4492 (D.N.D., Dec. 12, 1969),
appeal docketed, No. 20217, 8th Cir., March 23, 1970.
13. McLean v. Selective Service Local Board No. 47, Cir. No. 4492 (D.N.D., Dec. 12,
1969), appeal docketed, No. 20217, 8th Cir., March 23, 1970.
14. Id.
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was demonstrated by the arguments presented in the instant case.1 5
However, if section 15 (b) is read in light of section 3 (b), the
meanings of both sections are somewhat clearer. Section 3 (b) com-
mands the local board to reopen whenever facts are presented
which establish the registrant's eligibility for a I-S (c) classification
because he is satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course of instruc-
tion (emphasis supplied)."" Thus section 3 (b) implies that a regis-
trant becomes eligible for consideration for a I-S (c) classification
by showing that he is enrolled in school without consideration of
the question of the concurrency of his being enrolled and the receipt
of his order to report. Therefore, section 3 (b) appears to define
a clearer and more inclusive prima facie case for purposes of
reopening than does section 15 (b).
Additional clarity in the meaning of the Regulations can be
achieved by reading section 3(b) in conjunction with section 2.
Section 2 gives the board the power to determine if new facts
presented to it are sufficient to warrant a reopening. However,
this section contains one exception to this broad power. It does
not allow the board to reopen after it has sent an induction order
to a registrant unless the new facts presented arose from circum-
stances over which the registrant had no control. 7 It appears
then that section 2 would have been sufficient in itself to accomplish
the result reached in the instant case (i.e. a denial of reopening
because the new facts arose from circumstances over which the
registrant had control) and any further sections such as section
3(b) which deals with reopening in I-S (c) cases would be unneces-
sary. Consequently, the reason for inclusion of section 3(b) in the
Regulations comes into question since it appears to be superfluous
when given the interpretation of the instant case. However, this
finding seems to be contrary to generally used rules of statutory
construction discussed above. It would therefore appear to be more
logically sound to conclude that section 3(b) was included to act
as an exception to the broad direction given to the board in re-
openings by section 2.18 This exceptional rule appears to command
a reopening whenever facts are presented which show that a regis-
trant is enrolled in school, regardless of the fact that this enroll-
ment resulted from circumstances over which the registrant had
control.
This analysis indicates that a contrary interpretation of section
3(b) should have been made by the court in the instant case.
15. Plaintiff introduced an Interpretation of § 1622.15(b) which has been accepted by
the U.S. District Court in Walsh v. Selective Service Local Board No. 10, 305 F. Supp.
1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) and this was rejected by the court in the instant case at 104.
16. United States v. Dale, 804 F. Supp. 1278, 1282 (D.N.H. 1969).
17. United States V. Rundle, 413 F.2d 329, 333-34 (8th Cir. 1969).
18. See United States v. Rundle, 413 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1969).
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However, before this interpretation should be accepted, it is felt
that any supposedly compelling policies which bear upon the inter-
pretation should be discussed to determine if the letter of the
statute as interpreted by the author is compatible with its spirit.
The policies which have been noted by the advocates of the
"narrow"' 19 interpretation of the instant case have basically been
two in number. First, it has been urged that the I-S (c) deferment
was created only to provide relief for a student who during the
school year receives an order to report for induction, having had
no opportunity to plan for the unexpected interruption, thus obvi-
ating the hardship and waste which such an interruption causes. 0
Second, it has been urged that a "broad" interpretation will impose
a severe administrative burden on the Selective Service System
because it would create a premium on stalling tactics, cause an
unmanageable increase in postponement requests, and increase the
possibilities for fraud on the part of the registrant.2 1
The first policy can be conceded as one of the motivating
factors in the enactment of section 3 (b). It is felt, however, that
this motive was not the only one existing and therefore is not
itself sufficiently compelling to require a "narrow" interpretation.
Rather, a more compelling and comprehensive motive caused the
System to enact section 3(b). Through this section, the System
attempted to counteract the hardships which would be imposed
upon the registrant by the System itself.
The System offers various procedures by which an induction
order may be reviewed or postponed,2 2 all of which involve the
administrative machinery of the System. Many of these procedures
often require the expenditure of many months of valuable time which
could be constructively used by the qualified student.2 8 Recognizing
this high probability of a wasting of resources, the System provided
relief in section 3(b) by eliminating the necessity of a student's
remaining uselessly idle while his legal rights are being exercised.
It is clear then that the System did not intend to penalize
a student who voluntarily enters school while legitimately exercising
his rights. Rather, it intended to prevent the interruption of the
school year without considering whether the student reasonably
19. The interpretation of the Instant case is labeled "narrow" because It would essen-
tially result in fewer mandatory reopenings pursuant to § 1625.8(b) than would the
"broad" interpretation given to the section by the court in McLain.
20. Peller v. Selective Service Local Board No. 65, 313 F. Supp. 100, 104 (N.D. Ind.
1970) ; Brief for Appellant at 12; McLain v. Selective Service Local Board No. 47, Cir.
No. 4492 (D.N.D. Dec. 12, 1969), appeal docketed, No. 20217, 8th Cir., March 23, 1970.
21. Peller v. Selective Service Local Board No. 65, 313 F. Supp. 100, 104 (N.D. Ind.
1970).
22. See 32 C.F.R. § 1625.3(b) (1963).
23. The instant case shows how the procedures for review and postponement of induc-
tion orders may involve the expenditure of many months of time. In Peller the plaintiff
received his initial order to report for induction on July 15, 1969, and was not finally or-
dered to report until February 5, 1970 at 101, 102.
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knew that he would be ordered to report for induction after enroll-
ment. The insignificance of this knowledge becomes more obvious
in light of the recently enacted "lottery" 24 system for determining
order of induction.
If, in fact, the System had intended to deny a reopening when
it found that the student reasonably knew of the probability of being
inducted after enrolling, then would it not follow that a student who
holds a lottery number of 160 and enrolls in September after is has
been made clear that his number will be called in September
is also not entitled to a reopening? It would appear the System
did not intend such a result by initiating the "lottery" and equally
apparent that it did not intend to base the reopening under section
3(b) on such untenable grounds as the student's knowledge of
his imminent induction since this would result in an arbitrary
and irrational granting of I-S (c) deferments.
It is also urged that a "broad" interpretation would result
in an increased possibility for fraud on the part of the registrant.
However, as was suggested by the court in U.S. v. Dale,2 5 the
Regulations contain sufficient safeguards against the fraudulent ac-
tivities of registrants to protect the System from the less than honest
plotting of a few registrants. In addition, it is stated that a "broad"
interpretation of section 3 (b) would impose an undue administrative
burden on the System by placing a premium on stalling tactics
and causing a radical and unmanageable increase in postponement
requests . 2 However, this position also seems unpersuasive.
Less than .05 percent of the registrants in the system hold
I-S (c) deferments.2 7 Thus it is felt by the author that a many
fold increase in the number of people attempting to secure a I-S (c)
as a result of the "broad" interpretation would still result in an
insignificant number of applications which could be easily handled
by the existing administrative machinery of the System. This con-
clusion is supported by the fact that the System itself provided
many procedures of review and postponement and thus must have
established sufficient machinery to absorb the impact of their utili-
zation, regardless of the fact that much of this machinery may
not now be in use.
Advocates of the "broad" interpretation of section 3 (b) also
urge that the universities have a legitimate interest in the "broad"
interpretation since it would prevent any disruption of the school
year and thus not adversely affect the smooth operation of the
24. The operation of the lottery system is explained in Local Board Memorandum
No. 99, Nov. 26, 1969; SSLR 2200:8.
25. United States v. Dale, 304 F. Supp. 1278, 1283 (D.N.H. 1969).
26. Peller v. Local Board No. 65, 313 F. Supp. 100, 104 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
27. National Advisory Commission, Report on Selective Service, at 152-53 (1967).
RECENT CASES
school. 28 However, this position is at least as unconvincing as
that which foretells of the unbearable administrative burden on
the System. Clearly, the number of people at each institution which
would be affected by the "narrow" interpretation of the instant
case would not be significantly greater than the number affected
by the "broad" interpretation.
This survey of the supposedly compelling policies appears to
yield but one conclusion. The Selective Service System in enacting
section 3 (b) intended to prevent waste of time and disruption of
the school year caused by the System itself, whether the student
enrolled with or without the knowledge of his forthcoming induction.
It balanced its interests in maintaining an orderly and efficient
procedure for marshalling available manpower 29 against the waste
and hardship imposed upon the student-registrant and struck what
is felt to be a proper balance which should not be upset by the courts.
JOHN P. BAILEY
29. See United States v. Nugent 346 U.S. 1 (1953).
No. 4492 (D.N.D., Dec. 12, 1969), appeal docketed, No. 20217, 8th Cir., March 23, 1970.
28. Brief for appellee at n. 21, McLain v. Selective Service Local Board No. 65, Or.

